In recent years a number of studies have appeared
which provide a much better understanding of the
tumultuous events in Southeast Europe during
World War II. Elisabeth Barker has made use of
recently opened British archival material to present
a detailed though narrowly focused examination
of Britain's policy in the Balkans as devised
and implemented by the Foreign Office and SOE.
While the work covers British policy toward all the
states from Hungary to Greece, the author devotes
much more space to countries other than Greece
and Yugoslavia.
Britain's interests in the area have traditionally
focused on the periphery in places such as Greece
and the Straits. During the interwar era Britain
tended to follow the lead of France in its relations
with the governments of the Balkan states. The
outbreak of war forced the British to attach greater
significance to the Balkans as a means of demonstrating
their ability to carry on the struggle in
Europe at a time when they were practically shut
out of the continent by Hitler. Their efforts at
bolstering the resistance of the Southeast European
governments to Nazi blandishments down to
1941, were, as the author clearly demonstrates,
inhibited by both a lack of resources and the fear of
provoking Hitler and thus achieved little success.
A clash with the Axis forces in this area was inevitable
as Hitler shifted his strategy from a direct
attack on Britain to one of dealing her a blow in a
"peripheral" place like the eastern Mediterranean.
The author notes Churchill's desire to use the
Balkans militarily to attack the Nazis as well as his
concern to keep the Russians from acquiring a
predominant position in the area after the war
ended. She then illustrates in detail the divergence
in outlook between the various policy and action
branches of the government that made British activities
in this area much less unified than many
have presumed them to have been. Barker also
mentions the differences of opinion between the
British and Americans over policy concerning the
Balkans but does not fully explore the problem.
As the war progressed and the balance tipped in
favor of the Allies, the British were faced with the
unwelcome though not unexpected fact that the
Soviet Union was now the dominant power in the
area. Whatever assurances the British had given to
the leaders of the Southeast European states were
negated by the fact that, except for Greece and to
some extent Yugoslovia, Britain's presence was
limited to propaganda, some military missions,
and a far from perfect intelligence network. Barker
644 Reviews of Books
argues persuasively that the British, acting on the
basis of political realism, recognized the certainty
of Russian dominance in Romania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary by the summer of I 944, and accepted this
as an accomplished fact in return for retaining a
measure of influence in an area of real interest,
Greece.
The author's choice of a year-by-year and a
country-by-country approach results in a large
number of chapters (twenty) and inescapable fragmentation
and repetition in the narrative. A third
of the text is devoted to the period from 1939 to
1941 and the rest to the years 194i and 1944. An
annoying though small number of typographical
errors (half a sentence is missing on page 230) do
not significantly detract from the considerable
worth of the book.
GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS
Ulniversity of South Carolina